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FLORIDA'S PROPOSED GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTEIT DOES NOT MEET THE PROBLEM
Within the past several years a rash of "Good Samaritan" statutes
have been enacted in many states.1 These statutes are designed to insulate physicians from civil liability for injuries caused by emergency
medical treatment rendered at the scene of an accident.
The Florida Legislature considered such an immunity proposal in
1963,2 but it was not enacted into law. Whether it should be enacted,
altered, or forgotten is the subject of this note. The problem will be
focused against the background of the common law and the considered opinions of those most affected by the proposal, the physicians
themselves.
THE PROBLEM

The Physician'sStandardof Care in Florida
In order to avoid liability the Florida physician must be responsible for the use of "ordinary skill and diligence" and for application
of the "means and methods ordinarily and generally used by physicians of ordinary skill and learning" in determining the "nature
of the ailment" and in acting upon this honest conclusion. The physician meets the standard if he applies the means and methods of a
"respectable minority" of the medical profession.4 His skill is also
measured in light of the standards of "local practice."5
This standard implicity necessitates an expert witness from the
local medical community. This means that the standard of care is
"fixed within the profession itself."6 The plaintiff's case is burdened
1. Alaska Laws 1962, ch. 6, No. 225; Ark. Acts 1963, No. 46; CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §2144; Conn. Laws 1963, No. 205; Ga. Laws 1962, No. 852; Ind. Laws 1963,
ch. 319; Me. Laws 1961, ch. 265; Md. Laws 1963, ch. 65; Mass. Laws 1962, ch. 217;
Mich. Laws 1963, No. 17; Miss. Laws 1962, ch. 413, No. 132; Mont. Laws 1963, ch.
93, No. 124; Neb. Laws 1961, ch. 110, No. 517; Nev. Laws 1963, ch. 219; N.H. Laws
1963, ch. 256; N.J. Laws 1963, ch. 140; N.M. Laws 1963, ch. 59; N.D. Laws 1961,
ch. 287, No. 207; Okla. Laws 1963, ch. 87, No. 206; Ohio Laws 1963, No. 14; Pa.
Laws 1963, No. 301; S.D. Laws 1961, ch. 137, No. 509; Tenn. Laws 1963, ch. 46;
Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 317, No. 100; Utah Laws 1961, ch. 135, No. 191; Va. Laws
1962, ch. 449; Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 94; Wyo. Laws 1961, ch. 42.
2. Fla. H.B. 411 (1963).
3. Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 511, 1 So. 2d 610, 613 (1941).
4. Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1954) citing Dahl v. Wagner, 87
Wash. 492, 495, 151 Pac. 1079, 1080 (1915).
5. Hill v. Boughton, supra note 3; Olschefsky v. Fischer, 123 So. 2d 751 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Crovella v. Cockrane, 102 So. 2d 307 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
6. Scott & Herring, Medical Malpractice in Florida, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 121,
125 (1959).
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even further by the decided reluctance of many doctors to provide
expert testimony for the plaintiff.7
As noted, when the malpractice plaintiff sues on an injury incurred
under normal circumstances he is faced with overcoming a standard
of care very favorable to the medical practitioner. The accident
emergency, however, is not a normal situation. The circumstances
contemplated by this note are those in which there is no hospital, no
officer, and none of the medical aids common to modern practice simply a doctor, his black bag, and an injured person. A typical case
would be the victim of an automobile accident. What is the standard
of care in this type of medical emergency? Apparently it is the same
standard, that of ordinary skill and diligence previously adverted to,
which applies to the office-visit patient. Hence, the pressure of the
emergency situation is not afforded explicit recognition in the attempt
to affix liability.
The Abandonment Doctrine
In addition to the office-visit standard of care, the physician rendering roadside emergency care is faced with an additional responsibility.
Once the patient-physician relation is established, there can be no
abandonment by the doctor without, in fact, providing a competent
replacement or without giving reasonable notice of cessation of
services in order that the patient might secure a doctor of his own
choice. 8 Practically speaking, this means the physician must follow
the emergency victim to the hospital and either secure a replacement
or continue his care. This is a bothersome requirement that forces
the medical practitioner to abandon his present business (for example,
a hospital round followed by scheduled office hours) and serve an
unknown person to the neglect of his regular patients. Quite obviously, this rule imposes a very real hardship on the out-of-state
physician on vacation in Florida. Any physician might be very willing
to stop, but the burden of "continued relation" often prevents him. 9
At this point it should be manifest that the law gives the doctor
little inducement to stop at an accident. It imposes an office-visit
standard of care where there is no office or the normal medical facilities necessary to a proper diagnosis of the injury. It holds him to a
continued relationship, even though the original interrelation was
fortuitous and in response to an humanitarian impulse.
7. Id. at 126.
8. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955); McGulpin v.
Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla.
826, 188 So. 815 (1939) (dictum).
9. See replies to survey of Florida physicians, infra at note 24.
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The Good Samaritanand the Common Law
There have been several cases in which appellate courts were
faced with determining the standard of conduct for which the Good
Samaritan should be responsible. Two points should be noted regarding these cases. First, the duty of a medical practitioner was not
in issue. Hence, the question whether a physician should be or
will be afforded the benefits of the Good Samaritan doctrine is subject to speculation. Second, the medical emergencies involved are
generally just the kind to which a standard different from the ordinary medical malpractice standard should be applied. The injured person has been grievously hurt under circumstances in which
the physician would have to act immediately without benefit of an
antiseptic emergency room, diagnostic equipment, medical instruments, or the patient's medical history. In these situations there are
several potential courses of action, and a doctor would have been
required to select one without benefit of the modern technology that
is often a necessary supplement to his skills.
What is the standard of care imposed upon the Good Samaritan?
What duties does the law impose on one who gratuitously renders aid
to an accident victim?
In Carey v. Davis,o the defendant's farmhand had suffered heat
prostration. The defendant directed that the unconscious plaintiff
be moved to a wagon where he lay exposed to the sun for four additional hours. The plaintiff asserted that this exposure resulted in
making him sick and wholly incapacitated for work. The court, in
finding for plaintiff, held that once a person assumes control over one
in "distress," he is "bound to act with reasonable prudence and care"
and that an "unavailing" effort should not "increase the injury.""
Hence, one standard is reasonable care.
In New York the duty is described in different language, but the
standard is probably the same. There the "volunteer is charged with
a duty of common ...

humanity to provide proper care and attention

12
so that at least the injured party is made no worse.'
Regardless of the verbal formula invoked, the defendant is re13
sponsible "for further injury resulting from lack of proper care."
An often litigated situation occurs when the volunteer, with no duty
in the first instance to render care, allegedly was unreasonably dilatory

10. 190 Iowa 720, 180 N.W. 889 (1921).
11. Id. at 726, 180 N.W. at 892.
12. Clark v. State, 195 Misc. 581, 89 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 276 App.
Div. 10, 93 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1949), rehearing denied, 276 App. Div. 940, 94 N.Y.S.2d
202 (1950), afJ'd, 302 N.Y. 795, 99 N.E.2d 300 (1951).
13. David v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 691, 693 (1st Ct.
App. La. 1960) (dicta). (Emphasis added.)
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in securing aid. 14 One court summed up the extant case law by noting that liability arises in most cases because the "defendant made
the situation worse, either by increasing the danger ...or by inducing
him [the injured person] to forego the possibility of help from other
sources."' 15 To repeat, the "rescuer must worsen the position of the
person in distress,"' 6 before liability will attach.
Dicta in a leading case,' 7 where the court held the "injury aggravation" doctrine applicable, is particularly interesting to the Good Samaritin who is also a physician. The court added an aside to the
effect that the defendant would have fulfilled his duty had he, after
assuming charge, taken the patient to his family or to a hospital. 8 If
this statement were to withstand the test of litigation and the Good Samaritan doctrine were to be applied to the physician, the principle
enunciated would abrogate the abandonment doctrine that vexes so
many doctors who contemplate stopping to render aid at roadside
9
accidents.
One case in this area runs contra to the law as previously set forth.
Griswold v. Boston & Maine Railroad2o enunciates the proposition
that there is no right of action against the Good Samaritan who renders emergency assistance. The Massachusetts court rejected the
theory that one has a "duty of common humanity" when he assumes
charge of a victim.21 The court noted that such doctrine "would al-

low an action against a Good Samaritan and let a priest and a Levite
go free." 2 2 Hence, if a jurisdiction should follow Griswold the volunteer would have no duty of good judgment or reasonable care and
apparently would be liable only for intentional misconduct.
Whether the Florida Supreme Court would adopt Griswold and
apply it to physicians, thereby rendering a Good Samaritan statute
superfluous, is open to question. At any rate, conjecture and speculation avoids the issue at hand. The adoption of the Griswold rule
ex necessitate would involve litigation and appeal. Doctors fear -law14. Gates v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564 (1919); David v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 13; Dyche v. Vicksburg S. & P.
R.R., 79 Miss. 361, 30 So. 711 (1901); Clark v. State, supra note 12; Steckman v.
Silver Moon, Inc., 77 S.D. 206, 90 N.W.2d 170 (1958); Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros.,

Inc., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 867, 287
N.Y. Supp. 136 (1935).
15. Steckman v. Silver Moon, Inc., supra note 14, at 211, 90 N.W.2d at 173

(dicta).
16. United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1962).
17. Gates v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., supra note 14, at 33, 213 S.W. at 568.
18. Ibid.
19. See replies to survey of Florida physicians, infra at note 24.
20. 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354 (1903).
21. Id. at 436, 67 N.E. at 356.

22. Ibid.
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suits per se- they think the mere bringing of a malpractice suit is
a stigma. 2 3 Hence, Griswold is no cure for our immediate ill, getting
physicians to stop, because the law as it, stands provides the rationalization not to stop.
As should be obvious from the preceding, there is no common law
doctrine particularly adapted to solving the problem created by the
physician who stops and renders aid, perhaps carelessly, to the victim
of an automobile accident or other mishap. The office-visit standard
ignores the realities of the circumstances. The liability for abandonment also ignores the very real problem of forcing physicians to cease
the work at hand. As noted, the case law dealing with the Good
Samaritan does not define the standard of care required of a physician
under similar emergency circumstances. In fact, there appears to be
no precedent indicating whether a physician would be allowed to
share in the advantages of the doctrine of no liability unless the injuries are aggravated.
Any solution to the problem must utilize what the medical practitioner believes his duty ought to be. It is recognized that the physician is at least partially justified in his reluctance to stop and
render aid at the scene of an accident. In order to solve the problem
then, it is obvious that the attitudes of physicians themselves must be
considered.
RESULTS FROM SURVEY OF FLORIDA PHYSICIANS

A recent survey of Florida physicians, conducted by the University
of Florida Law Review, included three questions relating to emergency medical care.2 4 Although the survey makes no claims concerning
the scientific accuracy of its measure of opinion, the answers should
be indicative of the prevalent attitude of Florida physicians inasmuch
as the findings are the result of impartial inquiry and are not testimony solicited by one with a vested interest in the result.
The first question asked whether a doctor should be held liable
for voluntary, on-the-scene, emergency treatment which, "might be
legally characterized as negligent." Twelve answered "yes" while
an overwhelming majority of sixty-two said "no." The survey solicited
comments and these indicated a general lack of understanding of what
constituted "legal" negligence. The most recurrent observation was

23. See replies to survey of Florida physicians, infra at note 24.
24. The survey was made by Stephen Kahn, a Florida law student. Questionnaires were sent to more than 130 doctors, at least one questionnaire to each
county in Florida, with the larger counties receiving more attention than the
smaller ones. The names of recipients were selected at random. There were 74
replies.
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a feeling that the law failed to recognize that roadside treatment can
amount to nothing more than first aid. Also noted was that first aid
administered by a doctor was given by the one best qualified to render
it. The doctors emphasized that it was impossible to diagnose completely and accurately under such adverse conditions. It was indicated that usually all that can be done is to control bleeding and preserve life until hospital care can be obtained.
The second question inquired whether the doctor's decision to
stop at the scene of an accident had been influenced by the knowledge
that emergency treatment was subjected to the same test of due care
as that applied to a doctor treating his own patients. The response
was forty-one "yes" and thirty-three "no."
The final inquiry bluntly asked whether the physician would
stop at an automobile accident if his services were obviously needed.
It is a discredit to the medical profession that over one-third answered in the negative. Other polls of physicians have shown that
up to one-half do not stop at accidents. 25 The comments on this
question ranged in emotion from the apologetic to the irate, from
the practical to the rash. Some favored the immunity solution. One
doctor capsuled his feelings by stating, "No protection, no service."
A recurrent chorus was a very real fear of lawsuits, coupled with an
observation of the stigma attending a malpractice action. There were,
of course, some shallow remarks about the "shyster lawyers" and the
avarice and crookedness of the "average lawyer, especially in Dade
County." One doctor observed that there were no negligence attorneys when Hipprocates made his oath. As previously noted, many
thought the law should recognize that poor conditions at an accident
scene are not conducive to adequate diagnosis or treatment and also
that physicians are still the best qualified to render assistance under
adverse circumstances. One doctor disliked having to travel with
the victim to the hospital. There were several adverse comments concerning the duty of a continued relation. Beneath the general bluster,
however, was a strong undercurrent of desire to volunteer regardless
of the legal implications. Of the sixty-two physicians who thought
no liability should attach for "legally negligent" treatment, a slight
majority, thirty-two, indicated they would stop regardless of the legal
complications.
Research collateral to the survey in the Journal of the American
Medical Association, as well as other sources, turned up some surprises. As noted earlier, physicians fear malpractice suits and use this
to rationalize away their duty to stop at accidents. The medical association journal has twice, in the past three years, explicitly told its
readers that the "risk of liability for furnishing ...emergency medical
25. Newsweek, Sept. 4, 1961, p. 41.
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care has been greatly exaggerated." 2 6 In one issue the fear was expressed that the "exaggeration . . .may lead physicians to neglect
their ethical duty to respond to emergency appeals for first aid. ' ' 21
Another journal, Medical Economics, sponsored a panel discussion of
current ethical problems facing the medical practitioner, including
the subject of emergency care. 28 The attorney-panelist stated for the
readers that there was little risk of a lawsuit arising out of emergency
care. He added that the doctor's reluctance to stop was clearly out
of proportion to the risk of a lawsuit.29 Thus two periodicals, with a
combined subscription of 373,725 in the medical field, have informed
physicians the fear of lawsuits does not justify the reluctance to stop
at the scene of an accident. Yet doctors doggedly persist in grasping a
phantom fear as a way of rationalizing away a clear-cut ethical duty.
This collateral research also indicated that a "Good Samaritan"
statute will not necessarily produce the desired result - care by
physicians for accident victims. In the roundtable discussion sponsored by Medical Economics, a physician-panelist from Michigan
stated that after the state-wide medical association procured passage
of an immunity statute, his "county society [was nonetheless] advising
physicians to continue to be circumspect in their handling of accident
cases."

30

The American Medical Association is reportedly opposed to the
passage of Good Samaritan laws.31 An association official has stated
32
that states which refuse to pass these laws "are on the right track."
Actions, however, often speak louder than words. While the association apparently opposes enactment, the A.M.A. legislative department acts as a clearing house of information on Good Samaritan acts
for state legislatures. 33 If the A.M.A. opposes the legislation, why
does it actively prepare kits "containing materials on . . . Good
Samaritan acts," 3 4 an obvious boon to any legislature contemplating
passage of an immunity statute?
The replies to the survey of Florida physicians highlight two
things: (1) emergency medical treatment is first aid and the law
should recognize this fact and, (2) if this is all that is needed, the
grant of immunity, argued by some as the only solution, is unnecessary. To elaborate, the proponents of the immunity statutes assert that
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
(1963).
34.

185 A.M.A.J. 794 (1963); 180 A.M.A.J. 706 (1962).
180 A.M.A.J. 706 (1962).
Medical Economics, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 119.
Ibid.
Id. at 126.
Newsweek, Sept. 4, 1961, p. 41.
Ibid.
American Medical Association Board of Trustees Report, 182 A.M.A.J. 417
Ibid.
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the legislation is necessary because doctors do not stop at accidents. The public welfare demands that physicians be encouraged
to stop. Ergo, give the physician immunity. Yet the survey indicates
that two-thirds do stop regardless of personal reservations. Even many
of those who believe no legal liability should attach for such treatment
feel bound to stop on the basis of a moral obligation. The consensus
of Florida medical opinion seems to be that a standard recognizing
first aid care would be sufficient.
THE STATUTORY APPROACH

In general, the Good Samaritan statutes are designed to grant immunity from civil liability for acts or omissions of physicians who
render medical assistance in an emergency situation. The purpose is
to deny a right of action to the victim so as to remove the physician's
fear of lawsuits and thereby induce doctors to give medical aid at
accident scenes. As noted earlier, this is not necessarily the result of
such legislation.
There are variations from the general theme. Some statutes require as a condition to the immunity that the care be given in "good
faith ' 35 or that the services be gratuitous. 36 Others state that gross
negligence dissolves the immunity37 or that the actor must be licensed
under state law.38 There is very little evidence that any of the
statutes thus far enacted have reached the real essence of the problem,
and hence these alleged statutory curatives appear to have made no
substantial contribution toward increasing the percentage of doctors
who stop and render emergency aid.
FloridaHouse Bill 411 (1963)
The Florida Good Samaritan statute, as proposed, is unique in
9
that it fails to grant any immunity whatsoever. The statute reads:3
No doctor of medicine . . . who in good faith and in the
exercise of reasonablecare renders emergency care to the victim
...at the scene of an accident or emergency, shall be held
liable.., for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission in rendering the emergency care, or as a result of any act,
or failure to act, in providing or arranging for further medical
treatment or care for the injured person or persons.
35.

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.

36. Ga. Laws 1962, No. 852.
37. Md. Laws 1963, ch. 65.
38. Laws of Utah 1961, ch. 135, No. 191.
39. Fla. H.B. 411 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
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The most striking anomaly of the bill is the condition precedent
to immunity. The treatment must be rendered "in good faith and
in the exercise of reasonable care," in order for the physician to be
entitled to the beneficence of the proposed legislation. If one of
the reasons prompting the legislation was the physician's fear of lawsuits, this bill is no curative at all. The ascertainment of reasonable
care ex necessitate involves a jury and a trial and the feared stigma of
a malpractice suit. The standard of "reasonable care" probably incorporates by implication the "ordinary skill and learning" standard
now applied in Florida. In short, the proposed statute gives the physician nothing he does not already have.
It is to be noted, however, that other features of the bill are positive elements of any ultimate solution and should be retained in
future proposals. The "immunity" is apparently not limited to treatment of automobile accident victims - any "accident or emergency"
qualifies. Putting aside the question whether any immunity at all is
granted by the statute, the extension to a broad variety of accidents
or emergencies (not including the hospital or office-visit type) is good.
Note, however, that only care rendered "at the scene" of the emergency qualifies. This requirement precludes an unwarranted extension
of immunity to care after the initial treatment. The bill also purports
to eliminate the legal duty of continued treatment, a modification
urged by several physicians answering the Florida Law Review survey. The bill extends its nebulous protection to all doctors of medicine, regardless of where they are licensed. This feature also is in
the public interest - an out-of-state physician is capable of rendering
first aid treatment and the abrogation of his duty of further attendance would act as an inducement to stop. These latter facets of the
proposed bill all serve to allay the apprehension of physicians and
should thus induce more doctors to stop and render aid at an
accident.
A Modest Proposal
Any proposal in this area necessarily feels the tug of two conflicting values. On the one hand is the feeling that physicians ought
to be responsible for culpable errors in judgment. This value judgment insists that the common law provides adequate protection. Fur40
ther, doctors have an ethical duty to aid all persons in an emergency.
On the other hand, physicians are suit conscious. Lawsuits stigmatize
and the present standards do not recognize the poor conditions for
medical treatment present at accident scenes.
40.

STETLER

&

MORITz,

DOCTOR AND

PATIENT

AND

THE

LAW

334

(1961).

See

also American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics §5 (1957).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 5
1965]

NOTES

In the writer's opinion, however, absolute immunity is not the
answer, nor is the present status of the law very conducive to a fair
solution of the problem. A statute recognizing the equities on
both sides of the coin would do two things: (1) give affirmative statutory recognition that reasonable care at the scene of an accident
means reasonable first aid care under the circumstances, and (2) remove the duty to render continuing medical care after the initial
establishment of the doctor-patient relationship, that is, abrogate the
abandonment doctrine. Thus, a doctor stopping at the scene of an
accident could administer the initial medical ministrations (for example, apply bandages, splints, or tourniquets), make sure the victim
will receive further care (if the injury warrants such) and then be
on about his business without the fear of liability. Hence, such legislation would leave the doctor responsible for his reprehensible misconduct, a proposition with which no man can quarrel and yet recognize the realities of accident scene care.
A Typical Case
An illustration should serve to indicate the reasonableness of the
above-mentioned proposal. The incident occurred in the following
manner and was related by one of the physicians who answered the
survey questionnaire. The physician arrived at the scene of an
automobile accident. He treated a female victim who had suffered
minor cuts and abrasions, apparently caused by being thrown from
the car. The physician attended the wounds and then told the woman
to go to a hospital to have the remaining asphalt cleaned out of her
elbow. The physician went on about his business. He was sued and
paid an adverse judgment, apparently on the theory that he abandoned his "patient."
One's first reaction is "why"? This man fully met his moral obligation; the woman had no severe injuries, in fact she probably caused
the complications herself by neglecting to follow the advice to go
to the hospital. It is understandable that the physician in this situation was irate. What social purpose does the law serve when it imposes
civil liability on this doctor? No one in good conscience could ask
this man to do more - but the law does. Small wonder that many
physicians react adversely to "shyster lawyers." The proposal presented by this writing solves this problem because it imposes no duty
of a continued relationship, and it requires only that the physician
meet the standard of reasonable first aid care.
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CONCLUSION

Many oppose any form of immunity legislation. They believe, and
rightly so, that doctors should be as responsible for misconduct as
anyone else. Yet some statutory reform is obviously needed. The
realities of accident-scene treatment must be recognized. Adequate,
much less thorough, diagnosis is often impossible. The law should
recognize these realities in an affirmative manner. The nebulous
standard of "reasonable care" is not the answer nor is a grant of complete immunity.
WILLIAM R. MIDDELTHON, JR.
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